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Quantum-Resilient Infrastructure: Migrating US Financial Payment System to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Standards to Prevent 'Harvest Now, Decrypt Later' Attacks

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Abstract: The imminent advent of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) poses an existential threat to the US financial infrastructure. Current payment rails including FedWire, CHIPS, and ACH rely on RSA and ECC standards that are mathematically vulnerable to Shor's Algorithm. This facilitates "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attacks, where encrypted data is intercepted today for future decryption. This paper evaluates the migration to NIST-standardized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), specifically ML-KEM and ML-DSA. We analyze the architectural challenges of integrati

ng these primitives into ISO 20022 formats, focusing on the trade-offs between increased packet size and sub-millisecond latency requirements. By proposing a phased migration framework using Hybrid Cryptographic Wrappers, this research provides a roadmap for maintaining regulatory compliance under NSM-10 while preventing a systemic collapse of digital trust and the associated multi-trillion-dollar risk to the US GDP.

Keywords: Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), Harvest Now Decrypt Later (HNDL), Lattice-Based Cryptography, ISO 20022, Hybrid Key Exchange, Cryptographic Agility, Shor's Algorithm, FedWire and CHIPS, Mosca's Theorem

1: INTRODUCTION

The stability of the global financial system is predicated on the mathematical intractability of specific computational problems. For decades, the security of digital transactions, interbank settlements, and sensitive financial records has relied on asymmetric cryptographic primitives, primarily RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). These systems provide the necessary framework for confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. However, the emergence of quantum computing threatens to dissolve these foundations. Unlike classical computers that process bits in binary states, quantum processors utilize qubits to exploit superposition and entanglement, enabling them to solve the very mathematical puzzles that protect the world's wealth in polynomial time.

1.1 The Quantum Threat to Global Finance

The transition from classical to quantum-enabled threats represents a paradigm shift in cybersecurity. While current financial systems are fortified against even the most sophisticated classical brute-force attacks, they are fundamentally vulnerable to quantum algorithms. The threat is not merely theoretical; it is a direct consequence of how quantum mechanics can be applied to number theory.

1.1.1 Shor's Algorithm and the Collapse of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

In 1994, mathematician Peter Shor demonstrated that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could factor large integers and solve discrete logarithm problems with exponential efficiency [1]. This discovery directly targets the two pillars of modern Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). RSA security depends on the extreme difficulty of factoring the product of two large prime numbers, while ECC relies on the difficulty of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. On a classical supercomputer, breaking a 2048-bit RSA key would take trillions of years a duration exceeding the age of the universe. In contrast, a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) utilizing Shor's algorithm could theoretically achieve this in a matter of hours [2]. The collapse of these standards would render digital signatures and encrypted tunnels (such as TLS) obsolete, allowing unauthorized actors to forge transaction authorizations and intercept private financial communications with impunity.

1.1.2 The Vulnerability of the US Federal Reserve and Private Clearing Houses

The US financial core, managed by the Federal Reserve and private entities like the Clearing House, represents the highest value target for quantum-enabled adversaries. Systems such as FedWire, which process trillions of dollars in daily settlements, are deeply integrated with legacy encryption protocols. A successful breach of these centralized hubs could trigger a systemic liquidity crisis. Research by the Hudson Institute suggests that a quantum-enabled disruption of the FedWire system could result in a direct loss of 10% to 17% of the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP), equating to trillions of dollars in indirect economic damage [3]. Because these clearing houses act as the "plumbing" for the global economy, their reliance on vulnerable asymmetric cryptography creates a single point of failure that could be exploited to destabilize national and international markets simultaneously.

1.2 Defining 'Harvest Now, Decrypt Later' (HNDL)

While a CRQC capable of breaking 2048-bit RSA does not yet exist, the threat to financial data is immediate due to the "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) strategy. Adversaries ranging from state-sponsored groups to sophisticated criminal syndicates are currently intercepting and archiving vast quantities of encrypted traffic.

1.2.1 Data Longevity vs. Quantum Timelines (Mosca's Theorem)

The HNDL threat is best understood through Mosca's Theorem, which posits that if the time data must remain confidential (x) plus the time it takes to migrate to quantum-safe systems (y) exceeds the time remaining until a CRQC is developed (z), then the system is already compromised [4]. In the financial sector, x is often decades; records of high-value asset transfers, trust agreements, and institutional identities must remain secret for 25 to 50 years. Given that a CRQC may emerge within the next 10 to 15 years, data encrypted today using classical methods is effectively already vulnerable to future decryption. This "quantum gap" necessitates an immediate shift in how data is protected at rest and in transit.


QUANTUM THREAT TO GLOBAL FINANCE:
VULVERBILITY OF US FINANCIAL CORE
FedWire
CHIPS
ACH Network
SYSTEMIC LIQUIDITY CRISIS 10-17% US GDP LOSS
QUANTUM
SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE
HARVEST NOW, DECRYPT LATER (HNDL
ADVERSARY
HARVESTED ENCRYPTED DATA
TODAY (2024)
CRQC ARRIVAL (2035?)
MOSCA'S THEOREM: THE QUANTUM GAP
If x + y > z, System Compromised
DECRYPT LATER
DATA LONGEVITY (25-50 Yrs)
SSN
z TIME TO CRQQ (10-15 Yrs)
MIGRATION TIME (10-15 Yrs)
THE QUANTUM GAP
Debt Records
Debt Records
DATA ENCRYPTED TODAY IS VULNERABLE

Figure 1: 'Harvest Now, Decrypt Later' (HNDL)

1.2.2 Economic Implications of Retroactive Data Exposure

The retroactive decryption of decades-old financial data would have catastrophic consequences for market integrity and corporate privacy. Beyond immediate theft, the exposure of historical trade secrets, investment strategies, and sensitive client information could fuel corporate espionage on an unprecedented scale. Furthermore, the ability to forge historical digital signatures would undermine the legal standing of digital contracts and property titles. This could lead to a total breakdown of trust in digital record-keeping, forcing a regressive and costly return to physical verification methods or causing a permanent devaluation of digitally-held assets [5].

1.3 Research Objectives and Scope

The objective of this research is to define a robust migration framework for the US financial system, moving away from vulnerable classical algorithms toward Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). This involves evaluating the performance impacts of NIST-selected algorithms on high-speed financial infrastructure.

1.3.1 Focus on FedWire, CHIPS, and Real-Time Payments (RTP)

This paper focuses specifically on high-value, systemic payment rails including the FedWire Funds Service, the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), and the newer Real-Time Payments (RTP) network.

These systems are characterized by their need for near-instant settlement and high throughput. The research evaluates how the larger key sizes and increased computational overhead of PQC algorithms such as ML-KEM and ML-DSA will interact with the low-latency requirements of these critical services [6]. By focusing on these core utilities, this study aims to provide a blueprint for a quantum-resilient financial infrastructure that can withstand the inevitable arrival of the quantum era.

2: CURRENT VULNERABILITIES IN PAYMENT RAILS

The integrity of the United States financial payment rails is fundamentally tied to the security of its cryptographic foundations. As current infrastructures transition toward modernization, they remain tethered to legacy asymmetric encryption standards that are structurally incapable of resisting quantum-enabled cryptanalysis. The technical debt inherent in these systems spanning from the mathematical primitives to the physical hardware creates a systemic vulnerability that could be exploited through "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) strategies. This chapter examines the specific weaknesses within legacy standards, the evolving messaging protocols, and the hardware limitations that currently hinder quantum-resilient migration.

2.1 Legacy Encryption Standards in US Payments

Modern payment systems rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to facilitate secure identity verification and key exchange. These systems predominantly utilize two mathematical architectures: integer factorization and discrete logarithms. While these have proven robust against classical computing, their reliance on specific algebraic structures makes them uniquely susceptible to the sub-exponential and polynomial-time solutions offered by quantum algorithms [7].

2.1.1 Dependency on RSA and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

The Federal Reserve’s FedWire and the Clearing House’s CHIPS networks heavily utilize RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) for digital signatures and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) for session key establishment. The security of RSA-2048 is defined by the difficulty of factoring a large composite number $n = pq$. The encryption process follows the formula:

$$C \equiv M^e \pmod{n}$$

where M is the message and e is the public exponent. The decryption, which is the target of quantum adversaries, relies on the private exponent d:

$$M \equiv C^d \ (mod n)$$

Conversely, ECDH relies on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). In this framework, for a point P on a curve and a scalar k, finding k from Q = kP is computationally expensive for classical machines. However, Shor’s algorithm bypasses these challenges by finding the period of a function related to these problems, effectively reducing the security strength of a 2048-bit RSA key to zero once a quantum computer with approximately 2n logical qubits is available [8].

The financial sector's reliance on these standards is not merely a software choice but is often hard-coded into the communication handshake of interbank terminals. The "quantum gap" is particularly dangerous because, unlike symmetric encryption (e.g., AES-256), which only requires a doubling of key length to remain secure against Grover’s algorithm, asymmetric standards like RSA and ECC must be entirely replaced by new mathematical families, such as lattice-based or hash-based cryptography [9].

2.1.2 Mathematical Breakdown of the Quantum Advantage

The specific threat to the financial sector lies in the transition from exponential time complexity to polynomial time complexity. For a security parameter \lambda, classical factorization using the General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) operates with a complexity of:

$$O\left(\exp\left(\left(\frac{64}{9}\right)^{1/3}(\ln n)^{1/3}(\ln\ln n)^{2/3}\right)\right)$$

This exponential growth provides the "safety margin" banks rely on. Shor’s algorithm, however, reduces this to:

$$O\left((\log n)^2(\log\log n)(\log\log\log n)\right)$$

This radical shift means that the computational "work" required to forge a FedWire transfer signature becomes trivial for a quantum adversary, potentially allowing for the unauthorized redirection of trillions of dollars in real-time settlement funds [10].

2.2 Inter-bank Communication Protocols

As the US payment infrastructure migrates toward the ISO 20022 standard to enable richer data and better interoperability, the underlying security transport layers (TLS 1.2 and 1.3) remain a focal point for quantum vulnerability. While ISO 20022 improves the "language" of payments, it does not inherently mandate the "vault" in which those messages are carried.

2.2.1 ISO 20022 Security Gaps in a Quantum Context

The adoption of ISO 20022 introduces significantly larger message payloads compared to the legacy MT (Message Text) formats. When combined with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), which also requires larger digital signatures and public keys, the total packet size can exceed the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of standard network interfaces [11]. This creates a "fragmentation risk" where financial messages could be dropped or delayed, impacting real-time settlement. Furthermore, the current ISO 20022 implementation roadmap focuses primarily on data transparency rather than cryptographic agility.

The lack of native PQC support within the initial ISO 20022 specifications means that financial institutions must layer PQC on top of existing protocols, often through "hybrid" schemes. A hybrid key exchange formula, designed to protect against both classical and quantum threats, can be represented as:

$$K_{shared} = KDF(K_{ECC} \parallel K_{PQC}, Context)$$

where KDF is a Key Derivation Function, K_{ECC} is the classical key, and K_{PQC} is the quantum-safe key (e.g., from ML-KEM). Without this hybrid approach, a flaw in a nascent PQC algorithm could leave the system more vulnerable than it was before the migration. Historically, financial protocols have been rigid; the transition from SSL 3.0 to TLS 1.2 took over a decade in some banking sectors, suggesting that the migration to PQC-ready ISO 20022 will face significant bureaucratic and technical inertia [12].


QUANTUM ADVANTAGE: EXPONENTIVAL TO POLNOMICAL
CLASSICAL COMPLEXITY (SHOR'S ALOORIHIM)
HOURS/DAYS
HOURS/DAYS
Q
INSTANT FORGERY
FedWire Transfer
ISO 20022 SECURITY GAPS & HYBRID SOLUTION
THE PROBLEM: FRAGMENTATION RISK
ISO 20022 MESSAGE
PQC SIGNATURE SIGNATURE
MTU 1500 BYTE LIMIT
THE SOLUTION: HYBRID CRYFPTORAPHY
CLASSICAL (ECDH)
SECURE HYBRID TBIID TLS 1.3 CONNECTION
Protects Against Both Classical & Quantum Threats

Figure 2: Quantum Advantage Impact on Inter-bank Protocols and Hybrid PQC Integration Logic

2.2.2 Vulnerabilities in SWIFT and Automated Clearing House (ACH)

The ACH network, which handles the bulk of consumer transactions and payroll, relies on batch processing. These batches are often signed and encrypted at the file level. If an adversary harvests these files today, they gain access to millions of Social Security numbers, bank account details, and routing numbers once quantum decryption is viable. The vulnerability lies in the long-term sensitivity of this data; while a payment token might expire, the underlying PII (Personally Identifiable Information) does not [13].

2.3 Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) and Limitations

Financial institutions protect their master keys within Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) hardened physical devices designed to perform cryptographic operations in a secure environment. These devices represent a significant bottleneck in the transition to quantum-resilient infrastructure.

2.3.1 Physical Constraints of Current Financial Hardware for PQC

Most currently deployed HSMs are optimized for the modular exponentiation required by RSA or the point multiplication required by ECC. They are not architecturally designed for the matrix-vector multiplications and polynomial arithmetic central to lattice-based PQC algorithms like CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM) or CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA) [14].

Performance benchmarks indicate that implementing ML-KEM on legacy HSM hardware can result in a throughput drop of up to 90% due to memory constraints and lack of specialized instruction sets. The physical memory (RAM and NVRAM) within these modules is often limited to a few megabytes, which is insufficient for storing significantly larger public keys and state information required by PQC standards. For example, while an ECC public key is typically 32-64 bytes, a Dilithium (ML-DSA) public key can exceed 1,300 bytes.

2.3.2 Throughput Degradation and Latency in Payment Processing

The operational impact of PQC on payment rails can be quantified by the increase in computational cycles. If $T_{classical}$ represents the time to sign a transaction classically and T_{PQC} represents the time using lattice-based signatures, the latency overhead ΔL is:

$$\Delta L = \frac{T_{PQC} - T_{classical}}{T_{classical}} \times 100\ \%$$

For high-frequency trading and real-time settlement systems, where latency is measured in microseconds, a ΔL of even 50% can lead to queueing delays and potential timeouts in the "Handshake" phase of the Financial Information eXchange (FIX) protocol [15]. This hardware limitation reinforces the HNDL threat: if the physical infrastructure cannot support PQC today, every transaction recorded remains a "sitting duck" for future quantum decryption.

Furthermore, the heat dissipation and power consumption of running complex PQC algorithms on non-optimized silicon pose operational risks for data centers processing millions of transactions per second. This necessitates a total hardware refresh across the US financial system, a process that historically takes 7 to 10 years to complete across all member banks of the Federal Reserve [16].

3: NIST PQC STANDARDS & ALGORITHM SELECTION

The transition of the United States financial payment system to a quantum-resilient state necessitates a radical departure from the algebraic structures that have defined digital commerce since the mid-1970s. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has concluded a rigorous, multi-year global competition to identify and standardize algorithms capable of resisting cryptanalytic attacks from both classical and quantum adversaries. For critical infrastructures such as the Federal Reserve’s FedWire, the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), and the Automated Clearing House (ACH), the selection of these algorithms is not merely a software update; it is a high-stakes engineering trade-off involving security margins, computational overhead, and the physical limitations of network bandwidth.

3.1 Lattice-Based Cryptography (ML-KEM/Kyber)

The cornerstone of the new quantum-safe era is Lattice-Based Cryptography (LBC). LBC relies on the geometric complexity of finding specific points in a multi-dimensional grid, typically involving thousands of dimensions. The primary standard for key establishment selected by NIST is the Module Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), originally developed under the name CRYSTALS-Kyber.

3.1.1 Performance Metrics and Mathematical Foundations

ML-KEM is built upon the Module Learning with Errors (M-LWE) problem, which is a variant of the standard LWE problem optimized for efficiency and smaller key sizes. In this framework, security is tied to the difficulty of distinguishing a noisy linear equation from a truly random one. The mathematical structure involves a module M over a cyclotomic ring $R_q = Z_q[x]/(x^n + 1)$, where n=256 and q=3329.

A simplified representation of the encryption operation, which would occur millions of times daily across US financial hubs, is defined as follows:

$$c_1 = \boldsymbol{A}^{\boldsymbol{Tr}} + \boldsymbol{e_1}$$

$$c_2 = \boldsymbol{t}^{\boldsymbol{Tr}} + e_2 + \left\lceil \frac{q}{2} \right\rfloor m$$

In this equation, $\boldsymbol{A}$ is a public matrix representing the lattice, $\boldsymbol{r}$ is a secret noise vector sampled from a centered binomial distribution, and m is the message bit being encrypted. The decryption requires the secret key $\boldsymbol{s}$ to compute the approximation $m \approx c_2 - \boldsymbol{s}^T c_1$. The "error" terms (e_1, e_2) are critical; they prevent classical Gaussian elimination from solving the system, while the lattice structure itself remains resistant to Shor's algorithm [17].

For high-speed financial transaction signing, performance is measured in "cycles per operation." Comparative analysis shows that while ML-KEM is computationally efficient often performing faster than RSA-3072 on modern CPUs, it suffers from significant "data bloat." In a high-throughput environment like the FedWire Funds Service, the bandwidth-to-latency ratio is governed by the extended transmission time required for larger keys:

$$\text{Latency}_{\text{total}} = \text{Time}_{\text{comp}} + \frac{\text{Size}_{\text{key}} + \text{Size}_{\text{ciphertext}}}{\text{Bandwidth}}$$

Research indicates that ML-KEM-768 (providing security roughly equivalent to AES-192) requires approximately 1,184 bytes for a public key and 1,088 bytes for a ciphertext. When compared to the legacy Curve25519 (which uses only 32 bytes), this represents a nearly 3,700% increase in the data required for an initial handshake. For the Federal Reserve, which manages millions of simultaneous encrypted tunnels, this requires a fundamental architectural shift in buffer management within the network stack. Failure to adjust these buffers leads to "bufferbloat," where the accumulation of large key packets causes significant tail latency, potentially delaying the settlement of time-sensitive interbank payments [18].


MODULE LATTICE-BASED KEM (ML-KEM) PRIMITIVE
Public Matrix A
Secret
Error Vector e
Noisy Function
Noisy Result (Public Key)
Security basis of LWE Problem
Message
PERFORMANCE METRICS: DATA BLOAT & LATENCY
ML-KEM-768
3700% INCREASE
BUFFERBLOAT & DELAY
Classical Handshake
PQC Handshake
ARCHITECTURAL SHIFT: FEDERAL RESERVE NETWORK STACK
LEGACY GATEWAY
PQC-READY GATEWAY
Legacy Gateway
Small Buffer
PACKET DROP
Hardware Accelerated (NTT Engine)
Time to First Byte: Dramatically Increased
Jumbo Frame Enabled (MTU 9000)
Optimized Network Pack
HIGH-THROUGHPUT, LOW LATENCY SETTLEMENT

Figure 3: ML-KEM Performance and Network Impact on Financial Systems

3.1.2 Algorithmic Agility and Implementation Vulnerabilities

Implementation of ML-KEM in financial "rails" must also account for side-channel attacks (SCA). Unlike classical algorithms, lattice-based schemes are uniquely susceptible to timing and power analysis attacks during the "rejection sampling" phase of coordinate generation and the "compression" of coefficients. Financial institutions must implement "constant-time" polynomial multiplication using the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). The NTT complexity is $O(n \log n)$, which is significantly faster than standard convolution but requires specialized hardware acceleration.

The NTT-based multiplication of two polynomials a and b in the ring can be expressed as:

$$\text{mult}(a, b) = \text{NTT}^{-1}(\text{NTT}(a) \circ \text{NTT}(b))$$

where ∘ denotes point-wise multiplication. Modernizing US payment infrastructure requires integrating these NTT-optimized circuits into the next generation of financial Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). Without such hardware-level support, the software-only implementation of PQC could result in a 10x degradation in the number of concurrent TLS sessions a bank's gateway can support, creating a bottleneck for real-time commerce [19].

3.2 Digital Signature Schemes (ML-DSA and SLH-DSA)

Digital signatures ensure the "Non-Repudiation" and "Integrity" of payment orders. When a member bank initiates a 1 billion transfer via CHIPS, the digital signature serves as the cryptographic proof that the message was not altered in transit and was indeed authorized by the sender. NIST has standardized ML-DSA (Module-Lattice Digital Signature Algorithm, formerly Dilithium) and SLH-DSA (Stateless Hash-based Digital Signature Algorithm, formerly SPHINCS+).

3.2.1 Balancing Signature Size with Packet MTU Limits

The primary challenge for ML-DSA in financial networks is the sheer size of the signature. An ML-DSA-65 signature is approximately 3,293 bytes. Standard Ethernet frames utilize a Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of 1,500 bytes. This creates a severe fragmentation problem where a single signed ISO 20022 payment message already heavy with metadata must be split across three or more IP packets.

If N_{frag} is the number of fragments, the probability of a successful message delivery $(P_{success})$ in a lossy or congested network environment (where p is the packet loss rate) is modeled as:

$$P_{success} = (1-p)^{N_{frag}}$$

In high-volume financial hubs, even a minor increase in network congestion causes P_{success} to drop exponentially for PQC signatures compared to single-packet ECDSA signatures. This necessitates the adoption of "Jumbo Frames" (MTUs of 9,000 bytes) within the private fiber-optic backbones of the Federal Reserve and major clearing houses to ensure that the entire signature and its associated payment data can travel in a single frame [20].

3.2.2 Hash-Based Alternatives for Root of Trust

SLH-DSA (Stateless Hash-based Digital Signature Algorithm) offers a different security foundation, relying only on the properties of cryptographic hash functions (like SHA-3) rather than lattice problems. While SLH-DSA is considered more "conservative" and potentially more secure against future mathematical breakthroughs, it is computationally expensive. The signing process involves navigating a Massive Sparse Merkle Tree (FORS and Hypertree structures).

The signature size for SLH-DSA can exceed 17,000 bytes. Given this extreme overhead, SLH-DSA is likely unsuitable for per-transaction signing in a real-time system like the RTP (Real-Time Payments) network. However, its robustness makes it the ideal candidate for "Root of Trust" applications, such as signing the firmware of banking terminals or the long-term certificates used by the Federal Reserve's Certificate Authorities (CAs). The trade-off is clear: ML-DSA for performance-critical transactions, and SLH-DSA for the ultimate security of the infrastructure's foundation [21].

3.3 Evaluating Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms

To ensure immediate protection against "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attacks while acknowledging that PQC algorithms are relatively new and have not undergone decades of cryptanalytic scrutiny, the "Hybrid" approach has emerged as the global gold standard for the financial sector.

3.3.1 Maintaining FIPS Compliance and Structural Integrity

The hybrid approach combines a classical key exchange (such as ECDH over Curve P-256) and a quantum-safe key exchange (ML-KEM-768) simultaneously. The shared secrets from both are combined using a robust Key Derivation Function (KDF). The combined shared secret (SS_{final}) is derived as:

$$SS_{final} = \text{HKDF}(\text{salt}, SS_{ECC} \parallel SS_{PQC} \parallel \text{Label})$$

This construction ensures that the resulting symmetric key (typically AES-256-GCM) remains secure as long as *either* the classical problem (the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem) *or* the quantum problem (Module-LWE) remains unsolved. This provides a "fail-safe" mechanism: if a mathematical shortcut is found for lattice-based math next year, the system remains as secure as current classical standards [22].

From a regulatory standpoint, the US financial sector must adhere to FIPS 140-3. Current NIST policy allows for "FIPS-approved" classical modules to be augmented with PQC algorithms. This "FIPS-composite" mode allows banks to claim quantum resilience while maintaining their existing regulatory certifications. This is critical for the "Inventory" phase of migration, as it allows institutions to begin the transition without waiting for every PQC implementation to receive a standalone FIPS certificate.

3.3.2 The Impact of "Signature Stripping" and Protocol Downgrades

A significant concern during the transition period is the "Downgrade Attack." A quantum-enabled adversary could intercept a handshake and, through "Man-in-the-Middle" (MitM) interference, trick the server into thinking the client only supports legacy RSA-2048. To prevent this, the architecture must implement "Quantum-Hardened Negotiation" within the TLS 1.3 framework. This involves a signed extension where the client and server exchange a "Quantum Resistance Required" flag. If the final connection is not PQC-secured but the flag was present, the system must terminate the connection to prevent a Harvest Now attack [23].

3.3.3 Computational Cost and Load Balancing

The computational cost of the hybrid approach is cumulative, requiring both classical and quantum math. For a financial gateway, the total CPU cost (C_{total}) is:

$$C_{total} = C_{ECC} + C_{PQC} + C_{KDF}$$

In a data center processing transactions for a major US bank, this cumulative load necessitates an upgrade of load balancers and decryption offload engines. These engines must be upgraded to support "Lattice-Arithmetic" to ensure that the migration to quantum-resilient infrastructure does not result in a systemic slowdown or denial-of-service (DoS) condition for the US payment rails. By implementing these hybrid structures, the US financial system can begin protecting data longevity today, effectively neutralizing the HNDL threat before the first cryptographically relevant quantum computer is ever powered on.

4: MIGRATION STRATEGY AND ARCHITECTURE

Building upon the NIST algorithm selections detailed in Chapter 3, the transition of the US financial payment system from classical to quantum-resilient standards requires a meticulously engineered migration strategy. Given the systemic importance of the FedWire and CHIPS networks, which together process trillions of dollars in daily liquidity, a "rip-and-replace" approach is impossible. Instead, a phased architecture must be adopted to ensure that the migration does not introduce new vulnerabilities or operational instabilities. This chapter outlines a comprehensive strategy that bridges the gap between today's vulnerable Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the post-quantum future, focusing on cryptographic discovery, hybrid implementation, and the rigorous optimization of latency-sensitive settlement environments.

4.1 The Phased Migration Roadmap

The shift to PQC is not a singular event but a multi-year evolutionary process that involves stakeholders ranging from the Federal Reserve to the smallest community banks. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) and the Department of the Treasury must oversee a roadmap that prioritizes systems based on the longevity of the data they process, thereby addressing the "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) risk outlined in Chapter 1.

4.1.1 Phase I: Inventory and Cryptographic Discovery

Before a single PQC algorithm can be deployed, institutions must perform a granular "Cryptographic Inventory." Many financial institutions possess "hidden" cryptography—hard-coded keys in legacy COBOL-based mainframes or third-party APIs that facilitate inter-bank messaging. Automated Discovery Tools (ADTs) are utilized to scan the network for traffic patterns associated with RSA and ECC handshakes [24]. This discovery process involves deep packet inspection (DPI) to identify TLS versions and the specific cipher suites in use across the enterprise.

The discovery phase focuses on calculating the "Quantum Risk Score" (R_q) for every asset, which allows CISOs to justify the high cost of migration for specific sub-systems. This score is defined by the formula:

$$R_q = \frac{D_l + T_m}{T_q}$$

Where D_l is the data longevity (how long the data must remain secret), T_m is the estimated migration time for that specific sub-system, and T_q is the estimated time until the arrival of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC). If $R_q \geq 1$, the system is in immediate danger of HNDL attacks and must be prioritized for Phase II. For instance, mortgage records $(D_l = 30years)$ have a significantly higher R_q than a session token for a mobile banking login $(D_l = 1hour)$.

4.1.2 Phase II: Cryptographic Agility and Capability Building

Once the inventory is complete, the focus shifts to establishing "Cryptographic Agility." This is the ability of a financial system to swap one cryptographic primitive for another without requiring a complete rewrite of the application code. This is achieved by abstracting the cryptographic layer through standardized APIs, such as the PKCS #11 interface, which allows Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to support new NIST algorithms as they are finalized [25].

4.2 Hybrid Cryptographic Wrappers

As discussed in Chapter 3, the transition to pure PQC (ML-KEM/ML-DSA) involves risks, as these algorithms have not been "battle-tested" for decades like RSA. To mitigate both current quantum threats and potential future weaknesses in PQC, the US financial infrastructure must adopt "Hybrid Cryptographic Wrappers." This "defense-in-depth" approach ensures that even if a breakthrough in lattice reduction allows an adversary to break ML-KEM, the system remains protected by the classical ECDH layer against classical adversaries.

4.2.1 Implementing Dual-Signature Schemes for Backward Compatibility

A Dual-Signature (or Composite Signature) scheme allows a transaction to be signed with both a classical algorithm (e.g., ECDSA) and a post-quantum algorithm (e.g., ML-DSA). This ensures that the transaction remains valid in legacy environments while being quantum-safe for those that have already upgraded. The structure of a Composite Signature (σ_{comp}) for a payment message (M) is represented as:

$$\sigma_{comp} = (\sigma_{ECDSA}(M) \parallel \sigma_{ML-DSA}(M))$$

The verification logic V must return true only if both signatures are valid:

$$V(M, \sigma_{comp}) = V_{classical}(M, \sigma_{ECDSA}) \land V_{PQC}(M, \sigma_{ML-DSA})$$

This dual-signature approach is critical for the CHIPS network, where thousands of participant banks move through the migration at different speeds. By wrapping the PQC signature as an "extension" in the ISO 20022 message header, upgraded banks can verify quantum-safety, while legacy participants simply ignore the extension and verify the classical signature, maintaining uninterrupted service [26].

4.2.2 Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) Hybridization

For data in transit, specifically for bank-to-bank TLS 1.3 tunnels, KEM hybridization is mandatory. This involves the concatenation of the classical shared secret (K_{classic}) and the quantum-safe shared secret (K_{pqc}) before they are fed into a Key Derivation Function (KDF):

$$K_{final} = \mathrm{HKDF}(\mathrm{salt}, K_{classic} \parallel K_{pqc} \parallel \mathrm{Context})$$

This methodology prevents HNDL attacks because an adversary would need to solve both the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and the Module Learning with Errors (M-LWE) problem to recover K_{final}.

4.3 Impact on Latency and Throughput

The US payment rails, particularly the Federal Reserve's Real-Time Payments (RTP) system and the upcoming FedNow service, operate under extreme performance constraints. Settlements must occur within milliseconds, and any cryptographic overhead that pushes the processing time beyond the allowed threshold can lead to systemic delays and liquidity lockups.

4.3.1 Optimizing PQC for Sub-Millisecond Settlement Environments

The primary bottleneck in PQC migration is the computational complexity of lattice-based mathematics. As noted in Chapter 3, ML-DSA signatures are significantly larger than ECC signatures. In a sub-millisecond settlement environment, the total time budget (T_{budget}) is defined by the service level agreement (SLA):

$$T_{budget} \geq T_{net} + T_{sig\_gen} + T_{sig\_ver} + T_{db\_write}$$

To minimize T_{sig_gen} and T_{sig_ver}, financial gateways must utilize Hardware-Software Co-Design. This involves offloading the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) operations, which are the most computationally intensive part of lattice-based schemes, to specialized hardware.

Mathematical optimization can further reduce latency through "Parallel Verification." Since $V_{classical}$ and V_{PQC} are independent in a hybrid wrapper, they should be executed on separate CPU cores simultaneously:

$$\mathrm{Latency}_{hybrid} = \max\left(\mathrm{Time}(V_{classical}), \mathrm{Time}(V_{PQC})\right) + \epsilon$$

Where ϵ represents the negligible overhead of the final logical AND operation and thread synchronization. Furthermore, pre-computation of the error vectors $(\boldsymbol{e})$ in ML-KEM during idle CPU cycles can reduce the "Time-to-First-Byte" during the settlement handshake [27].

4.3.2 Throughput Modeling for FedWire under PQC

The increase in packet size due to PQC public keys and signatures has a direct impact on network throughput. If the FedWire system handles \lambda transactions per second, the introduction of PQC increases the bandwidth requirement (B) linearly with the signature size increase (S_{delta}):

$$B_{new} = \lambda \times (S_{classic} + S_{delta})$$

With ML-DSA-65 increasing signature size from 64 bytes to 3,293 bytes, the bandwidth requirement for the signing layer increases by a factor of nearly 50. To prevent a "Throughput Collapse," the migration architecture must include a transition to 100Gbps or 400Gbps backbone links within the Federal Reserve's private fiber network.

Additionally, the implementation of "Batch Verification" techniques is essential. In batch verification, a server can verify n signatures more efficiently than verifying them individually by taking advantage of the additive properties of lattices. The total verification cost C_{batch} for n signatures is:

$$C_{batch} \approx C_{individual} + (n-1) \cdot C_{addition}$$

Where $C_{addition}$ is much smaller than the full verification cost, allowing for a higher number of transactions to be processed per second in clearing houses [28]. By integrating these hardware-accelerated, hybrid, and optimized strategies, the US financial system can transition to a quantum-resilient state without sacrificing the high-speed performance required for modern global commerce.

5: REGULATORY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

The technical migration strategies detailed in Chapter 4 specifically the deployment of hybrid wrappers and hardware-accelerated lattice mathematicscannot succeed in a vacuum. The US financial sector operates under a dense canopy of federal regulations and international standards. A transition of this magnitude requires a synchronized policy shift to ensure that the "Quantum Risk Score" (R_q) calculated during the discovery phase is met with mandatory enforcement. This chapter examines the regulatory mandates driving the shift, the evolution of auditing standards, and the critical need for global interoperability as the US payment system prepares for the post-quantum era.

5.1 National Security Memorandums (NSM-8 and NSM-10)

The impetus for quantum migration in the United States is no longer merely an industry recommendation but a matter of national security. The White House has issued specific directives that categorize the security of financial payment rails as a primary defense priority, acknowledging that a collapse of the FedWire or ACH systems due to quantum decryption would constitute a national emergency.

5.1.1 Alignment with White House Mandates on Quantum Readiness

National Security Memorandum 8 (NSM-8) and the subsequent NSM-10 provide the legal and operational framework for this transition. NSM-10, specifically, mandates that all federal agencies including the Department of the Treasury and, by extension, the Federal Reserve begin the transition to PQC immediately to mitigate the "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" threat [29]. These directives are not merely suggestions; they set a ticking clock for the financial sector to modernize its cryptographic underpinnings before the advent of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC).

These mandates require that by 2035, all systems must be fully transitioned to NIST-approved PQC standards. However, the Federal Reserve is expected to lead this curve, aiming for a 2030 deadline for core settlement systems. The progress of financial institutions is governed by the "Quantum Readiness Quotient" (Q_{rq}), which provides a metric for regulators to assess institutional preparedness:

$$Q_{rq} = \frac{\sum(A_{migrated} \times W_{criticality})}{\sum(A_{total} \times W_{criticality})}$$

Where A represents the digital assets and W represents a weighting factor based on the systemic importance of the asset (e.g., core settlement ledgers carry a higher weight than internal email servers). Alignment with these mandates requires that financial institutions not only adopt ML-KEM and ML-DSA but also prove that their implementations are "cryptographically agile." This agility ensures that if a specific lattice parameter (such as the noise distribution in Kyber) is found to be weaker than expected, the system can be patched with a new primitive without a multi-year overhaul of the underlying hardware [30].

5.1.2 Executive Order 14028 and the Zero Trust Overlap

The transition to PQC is further reinforced by Executive Order 14028, which emphasizes "Zero Trust" architecture. In a Zero Trust environment, encryption is required for every internal micro-segment of the banking network, not just the perimeter. This means that internal inter-bank communication, which previously might have relied on legacy cleartext or weakly encrypted channels, must now adopt PQC. The policy impact here is a massive expansion of the scope of encryption, requiring a fundamental redesign of internal load balancers and identity providers to support PQC-compliant certificates [31].

5.2 Compliance and Auditing Standards

For the private sector, specifically the clearing houses and commercial banks that interface with the Federal Reserve, the shift to PQC will be enforced through updated compliance and auditing frameworks. These standards ensure that the hybrid cryptographic wrappers discussed in Section 4.2 are implemented correctly and consistently.

5.2.1 Updating SOC2 and PCI-DSS for Quantum Resilience

The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) and System and Organization Controls (SOC2) are the primary vehicles for enforcing security in the financial sector. Current versions of PCI-DSS (v4.0) emphasize the use of "strong cryptography" but have not yet mandated PQC. However, the roadmap for PCI-DSS v5.0 is expected to introduce "Quantum-Safe" as a requirement for data-at-rest encryption for any data with a retention period exceeding five years.

Auditors will begin evaluating "Quantum Vulnerability Windows" (W_v), a metric that determines if an institution's data will be exposed before they finish their migration. It is defined as:

$$W_v = T_{CRQC} - (D_{retention} + T_{migration})$$

Where T_{CRQC} is the expected date of quantum advantage, $D_{retention}$ is the legal data retention period, and $T_{migration}$ is the duration of the migration project. If W_v is negative, the institution is fundamentally non-compliant because their current data is already "harvestable" for future decryption. To satisfy SOC2 Type II audits, banks must demonstrate that their Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are not only FIPS 140-3 compliant but are also configured to handle the larger key sizes of ML-DSA-65 without causing "Timeout Exceptions" in transaction logs [32].

5.2.2 Quantum-Safe Attestation and Cryptographic Proofs

The transition also introduces the need for "Quantum-Safe Attestation" (A_q). In a multi-party settlement involving the Fed and a commercial bank, the bank must cryptographically prove to the clearing house that the session was established using a PQC-secured tunnel. This is achieved through a "Compliance Header" in the ISO 20022 message, which includes a hash of the PQC public key used in the handshake combined with a nonce to prevent replay attacks:

$$H_{audit} = \text{KDF}(\text{PK}_{PQC} \parallel \text{Nonce} \parallel \text{Timestamp} \parallel \text{RegulatoryID})$$

This allows regulators to retroactively verify that the data was protected against HNDL at the moment of transmission. Furthermore, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is expected to require "Quantum Stress Tests," where banks must simulate the sudden revocation of all classical certificates to ensure that their PQC fallback mechanisms operate without disrupting liquidity [33].

5.3 Global Interoperability

The US financial system does not exist in isolation; it is a node in a global network of cross-border payments. A unilateral move to PQC by the United States would be disastrous if it created friction with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) or European settlement systems like TARGET2 or the Eurosystem's T2.

5.3.1 Synchronizing with SWIFT and European Payment Standards

Interoperability depends on the synchronization of "Algorithm Suites." If the Federal Reserve adopts ML-KEM but European central banks adopt a different NIST-standard (or a non-NIST alternative), cross-border "Handshake Failure" rates will skyrocket. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is currently leading "Project Leap" to establish a global PQC communication standard for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and traditional RTGS systems [34].

The challenge lies in the "Maximum Common Denominator" of security. For a cross-border wire transfer (T) from New York to London, the end-to-end security is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain of correspondent banks:

$$\text{Security}(T) = \min\left(\text{PQC}_{US}, \text{PQC}_{SWIFT}, \text{PQC}_{UK}, \text{PQC}_{Recipient}\right)$$

To solve this, the US must champion the adoption of "Cryptographic Negotiation Protocols" that allow for automated algorithm fallback without succumbing to the downgrade attacks mentioned in Chapter 3. This involves a global "Key Registry" or "Public Key Directory" (PKD) where central banks can publish their supported PQC parameters.

5.3.2 Harmonization of Lattice Parameters and OIDs

Furthermore, synchronization with the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is required to ensure that Object Identifiers (OIDs) for PQC are unified. Without identical "Lattice Parameters" (e.g., the modulus q, dimension k, and the specific error distribution χ), two different implementations of ML-KEM might be mathematically incompatible. The policy framework must mandate a unified profile for financial PQC that specifies:

- **Parameter Set:** e.g., ML-KEM-768 for standard transactions.
- **Encoding:** Unified ASN.1 structures for keys and signatures.
- **Hybrid Logic:** A standard way to combine PQC and ECC outputs to ensure that "middle-boxes" and firewalls in different countries do not drop the packets due to unrecognized formats [35].

By aligning NSM-10 mandates with updated PCI-DSS audits and SWIFT's global standards, the US can ensure that its migration to a quantum-resilient infrastructure is not just a domestic success, but a cornerstone of a secure, global financial future.

6: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE OUTLOOK

The transition of the United States financial payment system to a quantum-resilient infrastructure is a defining challenge of the 21st century. As established throughout this paper, the convergence of "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) threats and the rapid advancement toward a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) necessitates a departure from the legacy Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that has underpinned global finance for five decades. This final chapter synthesizes the research findings, quantifies the catastrophic cost of further delay, and explores the emerging role of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) as a physical-layer supplement to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

6.1 Summary of Findings

The research concludes that the vulnerability of the US financial "rails" specifically FedWire, CHIPS, and the ACH network is not a future hypothetical but a present-day systemic risk. The core findings are summarized as follows:

1. **Algorithmic Obsolescence:** Classical asymmetric standards, including RSA-2048 and ECDSA, offer zero security margin against Shor's algorithm. The mathematical structures of integer factorization and discrete logarithms are fundamentally incompatible with the era of quantum superposition [1].
2. **Feasibility of NIST Standards:** The adoption of ML-KEM (Kyber) and ML-DSA (Dilithium) is technically viable for high-throughput financial messaging. While these algorithms introduce a "data bloat" factor of 30x to 50x in signature and key sizes, modern hardware acceleration and "Jumbo Frame" network configurations can mitigate the resulting latency [33].
3. **The Necessity of Hybridity:** A "phased migration" utilizing hybrid cryptographic wrappers is the only secure path forward. By concatenating classical and quantum secrets $\left(K_{final} = \text{KDF}\left(K_{classic} \parallel K_{pqc}\right)\right)$, institutions can maintain FIPS 140-3 compliance while building immediate resistance against HNDL attacks [22].
4. **Regulatory Urgency:** Compliance frameworks like PCI-DSS v5.0 and National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM-10) are the primary drivers of adoption. The calculation of the "Quantum Risk Score" $\left(R_q\right)$ is now a mandatory component of institutional risk management [29].


ALGORIFHTHIC OBSSOLESSENCE
RSA 2048
ECC
ZERO SECURITY
Shor's Algorithm renders classical crypto INSTANTLY breakable.
FEAISTILITY OF NIST STANDARDS
Data Bloat Factor
Classical
HARDWARE ACCELERATION
LOW LATENCY
ML-KEM & ML-DSA viable modern infrastrrcture upgrades.
NECESITY OF HYBRIDITY
CLASSICAL
QUANTUM
K_FINAL = DDF(CLASSIC || K PQC
Dual-layer protection for immediate HNDL defense.
REGULATORY URGENCY
DEADLINE: 2030
CRITICAL
Mandatory compliance to avoid avoid system risk.

Figure 4: Quantum Readiness metrics for US Payment Rails

6.2 The Cost of Inaction

The economic consequences of failing to migrate the US financial system are unprecedented in scale. Unlike a localized data breach, a quantum-enabled collapse of the Federal Reserve's settlement layer would trigger a global liquidity freeze.

6.2.1 Macroeconomic Impact and GDP-at-Risk

Recent econometric modeling by the Hudson Institute indicates that a successful quantum attack on the FedWire Funds Service could result in a direct loss of 10% to 17% of the US GDP, translating to an economic contraction of approximately 2.0 to 3.3 trillion. The "Contagion Effect" formula for such an event is modeled as:

$$\mathrm{Loss}_{Total} = \mathrm{Loss}_{Direct} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\mathrm{Impact}_i \times \mathrm{Interconnectivity}_i)$$

Where i represents downstream sectors (energy, logistics, retail) that depend on real-time interbank settlement. A delay in the clearing of high-value payments would prevent corporations from meeting payroll, fulfilling trade obligations, and maintaining supply chain liquidity, potentially launching the global economy into a "Quantum Depression" surpassing the severity of the 2008 financial crisis.

6.2.2 Systemic Erosion of Digital Trust

Beyond direct monetary loss, inaction leads to the permanent "Harvest Now" exposure of data with 30-year longevity, such as mortgage deeds, social security records, and long-term sovereign debt identities. Once these records are decrypted, the "Non-Repudiation" of digital signatures which is the bedrock of legal commerce vanishes. The cost of re-establishing a physical, paper-based "Chain of Trust" to replace a compromised digital ledger would incur billions in administrative overhead and decades of legal disputes [23].



Figure 5: Graph of Cost of Migration vs. GDP-at-Risk over Time

6.3 Future Directions in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

While PQC provides a mathematical solution to quantum threats, the future of financial infrastructure may also incorporate **Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)**, a method of using quantum mechanics (typically polarized photons) to exchange keys with "provable" security based on the laws of physics rather than computational complexity.

6.3.1 Physical Layer Defense for Critical Backbones

QKD offers a unique advantage: it is "eavesdrop-evident." Any attempt to intercept a quantum key alters its state, immediately alerting the Federal Reserve's security operations center. The secret key rate (R) in a QKD link is defined by the TDM (Time Division Multiplexing) efficiency:

$$R \geq f_s \cdot P_{click} \cdot (1 - H(e))$$

Where f_s is the pulse frequency, P_{click} is the probability of detection, and H(e) is the information leaked to an eavesdropper based on the error rate (e).

For high-value "backbone" links between the 12 Federal Reserve Banks, QKD provides a "fail-safe" layer that is immune to even future mathematical breakthroughs that might one day threaten lattice-based PQC. Major institutions like JP Morgan Chase and HSBC have already begun piloting QKD in "Metropolitan Area Networks" (MANs) to secure inter-office data synchronization [4.2].

6.3.2 The Hybrid Future: QKD + PQC

The ultimate architecture for the US financial system will likely be a "Defense-in-Depth" model that combines the versatility of PQC with the physical certainty of QKD.

- **PQC (ML-KEM/ML-DSA):** Used for "End-to-End" security across the public internet, mobile banking, and standard ISO 20022 messaging.
- **QKD:** Used for the "Core Infrastructure" links where dedicated fiber-optic lines can be established between primary data centers and the Federal Reserve.


END-TO-END PQC SECURITY
CORE QKD INFRASTRCTURE
BANK GATEWAY
GATEWAY CENTER
BANK GATEWAY & DATA CENTER
TRANSACTION LINKS
FEDERAL RESERVE HUB
FEDERAL DATA CENTER
FEDERAL EXCHANGE HOUSE
CRYPTORPHIC BACKBONE INTERNCECT
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH MODEL
• PQC (ML-KEM/ML-DSA): Endtp-End, Public Internet, Mobile, ISO02)
• QKD: Core Infrastucture, Dedicated Fiber, Central Bank Backbones

Figure 6: Proposed Multi-Layered Quantum-Resilient Architecture for 2030

Final Remarks

The migration to quantum-resilient infrastructure is no longer a choice but a requirement for the survival of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency. By aligning with NIST standards, implementing hybrid architectures, and adhering to strict regulatory timelines, the US financial system can transform a catastrophic threat into an opportunity for unprecedented cryptographic modernization. The time for inventory and discovery is over; the era of deployment has begun.

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